Digitalization or flexibilization? The changing role of technology in the political economy of Japan by Shibata, S.
This is a repository copy of Digitalization or flexibilization? The changing role of technology
in the political economy of Japan.




Shibata, S. orcid.org/0000-0002-5944-9721 (2021) Digitalization or flexibilization? The 
changing role of technology in the political economy of Japan. Review of International 





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
(CC BY-NC-ND) licence. This licence only allows you to download this work and share it with others as long 
as you credit the authors, but you can’t change the article in any way or use it commercially. More 
information and the full terms of the licence here: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rrip20
Review of International Political Economy
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rrip20
Digitalization or flexibilization? The changing role
of technology in the political economy of Japan
Saori Shibata
To cite this article: Saori Shibata (2021): Digitalization or flexibilization? The changing role of
technology in the political economy of Japan, Review of International Political Economy, DOI:
10.1080/09692290.2021.1935294
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2021.1935294
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 07 Jun 2021.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Digitalization or flexibilization? The changing role
of technology in the political economy of Japan
Saori Shibata
Leiden Institute for Area Studies, Leiden University, Leiden, Netherlands
ABSTRACT
We are increasingly surrounded by talk of digitalization. Yet, we remain unsure
about what impact this digitalization will have upon socio-economic institutions,
how the introduction of this digitalization will be contested, the likely role of the
state in managing the adoption of digital technology, and the likely consequences
for the broader political economy if and when it is introduced. This article examines
the process of digitalization as it has unfolded in the service sector in Japan. Based
on qualitative interviews with managers in the hospitality industry and union offi-
cials, the paper depicts a process that contrasts starkly with the more optimistic
view adopted by some commentators, according to which digitalization has the
potential to improve working conditions and contribute to a more stable form of
growth. Instead, the paper draws on Regulation Theory to argue that the introduc-
tion of digitalization is part of a wider process of neoliberalization. As such, digital-
ization has contributed to deskilling, the fragmentation of work tasks, a digital
divide, the intensification of work, and higher levels of workplace surveillance. This
represents a further dismantling of the social compromise that underpinned Japan’s
earlier period of economic growth.
KEYWORDS
Digital economy; digitalization; regulation theory; digital work; flexibilization; wage-labour nexus
Introduction
Digitalization has become one of the key topics facing those who study contempor-
ary political economy. This includes a concern for the speed and degree of change
created by new technologies, and questions over the ability and capacity of digital-
ization to fundamentally transform the contemporary way of being. For techno-
optimists, including ‘left maximalists’ such as Mason (2015) and Sirnicek and
Williams (2015), digitalization is a means to ameliorate or even abolish the
exploitation that constitutes wage-labour (Dyer-Witheford et al., 2019, p. 6). Other
techno-optimists, while acknowledging the potential for a move to lower-wage jobs,
nevertheless emphasize digitalization as a fundamental break from the past, having
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the capacity to create more value with less input (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014,
Ford, 2016), or a necessary means by which employers can re-skill and up-skill
their employees (World Economic Forum, 2018, pp. 18, 22–23).
In contrast, a group of more sceptical commentators have raised a number of
alarming concerns regarding the integration of technologies. Techno-sceptics are
wary of claims regarding the potential improvement in working conditions and
that automation is considered capable of bringing about (Dyer-Witheford et al.,
2019, p. 4). These sceptics view digital development and its research productivity
and capacity, as disappointing and exaggerated (Pupillo et al., 2018:45; Broussard,
2018, p. 69; Moody, 2018). Digitalization is costly, unintelligent and limited
(Broussard, 2018, p. 29, 69) and biased (Broussard, 2018, p. 80; Eubanks, 2018),
leading to unintended concerns/effects (Sugiyama et al., 2017), or has failed to
change class relations (Huws, 2014; Moody, 2018).
Other techno-sceptics either doubt the capacity of technologies or consider
harmful impacts that technology is likely to have on workers and the economy,
while acknowledging the effects of digitalization, they nevertheless warn that digit-
alization will replace a large number of jobs (Frey & Osbourne, 2013, Ford, 2016,
pp. 12–15; Nomura Research Institute, 2016; Frey, 2019). Some argue that digital-
ization creates a digital divide and produces a bifurcation between professional jobs
(management, consulting, financial services) and low-wage jobs (such as monitor-
ing and simple manipulation) (Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2016, pp. 6–7). Some claim that
algorithms and big data punish the poor and increase inequality (Eubanks, 2018)
or that they are used to promote zero-hour contracts in the interest of personal
gain (Mazzucato, 2019). Some emphasize the diminishing level of user’s self-con-
trol, as well as a reduction in human decision making under the digital age as the
Internet of Things (IoT) and AI seek to optimize outcomes and operation, and
therefore, takes away our choice, decision, human autonomy and power (Zuboff,
2019, p. 278; Korinek, 2019, p. 13). Moore views the introduction of workplace sur-
veillance as imposing agility on workers (2019, p. 126).
As we can see, views on the effects of digitalization are divided over the ques-
tion of the likely impact of digitalization upon the workplace, working practices,
and labour market inequality. These debates have been played out through a con-
sideration of what some might term the ‘uberization’ of work and society (Davis &
Sinha, 2021; Zwick, 2018; Thelen, 2018), considering especially the impact of gig
work and platform work upon different political economies (Wood et al., 2019;
Anwar & Graham, 2021; Shibata, 2020). They also reflect more longstanding
debates over the relationship between technological change and its impact upon
the power relations within the workplace (Burawoy, 1985; Rubery & Grimshaw,
2001; Moore, 2019). The paper explores these questions through a detailed consid-
eration of the process of digitalization as it has occurred in the case of Japan. In
doing so, it seeks to contribute to the ongoing study of comparative capitalisms,
which has gained in prominence in the field of IPE in recent years (Hay, 2020;
Hein et al., 2020). This represents a focus on the different socio-economic and
institutional configurations that constitute the national models of capitalism that
exist within an overall global economy and which are studied in order to under-
stand how those national configurations mediate the effect of broader socio-eco-
nomic trends (Hay, 2020). In doing so, it draws on Regulation Theory, which
highlights the role of key socio-economic institutions in enabling social
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compromise in order for growth and capital accumulation to occur (Boyer, 2018,
Lechevalier, 2014a), and therefore also points to the absence of such institutions,
and associated social compromise, as a source of dysfunctionality (Vidal, 2013).
The study adopts a Regulation Theory (RT) approach due to RT’s ability to help
inform a study of the nationally-specific institutional configurations that constitute
different national models of capitalism. In particular, Regulation Theory highlights
the way in which each model of capitalism must deal simultaneously with coordin-
ation problems and challenges arising from a number of institutional forms, espe-
cially: the wage-labour nexus, inter-firm competition, the form of money, the role
of the state, and the insertion of the national model of capitalism within the
broader global economy. This highlights the way in which the institutional com-
promises that are established, which together make up the ’mode of regulation’, in
turn affect each other and mediate more general global trends of capital accumula-
tion. In adopting a Regulation Theory perspective in the present study, therefore,
we are able to understand the move towards digitalization as an institutionally-
mediated outcome. The particular form, and mode of regulation, that characterises
Japan’s model of capitalism will, in turn, mediate the impact of processes of digital-
ization. As such, we come to understand that digitalization is not solely a process
of technological change; but instead is a process mediated by the changing institu-
tional conditions that constitute the national political economy within which
technological change occurs. It is this which is the subject of the present paper.
Japan is particularly well-suited for such a study for a number of reasons. Japan
is an advanced industrial democracy with a number of the key problems that digit-
alization has been identified as having the potential to address. In particular,
Japan’s ageing population and labour shortage are seen by many as key problems
that have the potential to be resolved through digitalization. In addition, Japan is
often considered a country where technology is well integrated into the workplace
in a way that generates important benefits for firms and the wider economy. Wu,
et al., for instance, view Japan as a major power in robot production, and the use
of robots in the service sector (2018, p. 4). Wright suggests that the Japanese state
has a more focused approach to its support for product development in robotics
than its rival countries such as China and South Korea (2020, p. 14). Ford high-
lights how one Japanese sushi restaurant chain has pioneered the use of advanced
technologies and in doing so made itself the most competitive in the industry
(2016, p. 15). Ford and Ross also view Japan as leading the world in robotics and
introduce Japan’s robotisation as a model for the eldercare, restaurant and manu-
facturing sectors (Ford, 2016, p. 25, p. 162; Ross, 2016, pp. 60–62). From an
anthropological perspective, Kovacic (2018) argues that robot technologies are posi-
tioned in Japanese society in such a way that they intermingle with Japan’s ‘thing-
making culture’ (monozukuri), familiar products, and nostalgic imaginary of
anime-based characters, and therefore tend to readily gain social acceptability
(pp. 585–586; for similar accounts, see Kovacic, 2018, p. 586, Ema et al., 2016,
Yamamoto, 2019). Japan is therefore often portrayed as a country context in which
technology has significant potential through which digitalization can generate
socio-economic improvements, thereby amounting to a ‘crucial case’.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, it sets out a Regulation Theory approach
and its implications in terms of how we can understand the process of digitaliza-
tion within Japan’s labour market, or in the terms of Regulation Theory: the wage-
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labour nexus. Second, the paper provides an overview of the key processes
observed within Japan’s political economy over recent years, highlighting especially
the way in which digitalization forms part of a wider process of neoliberalization,
in which the declared pursuit of improved employment and working conditions
conceal more malign processes of deskilling, the fragmentation of work tasks, a
digital divide, the intensification of work, and higher levels of surveillance. Third,
the paper presents a detailed case study of the process of digitalization in Japan’s
hospitality sector, based on qualitative interviews with both managers and union
activists, witnessing a number of the trends outlined above. Finally, the paper con-
cludes by arguing that, in contrast with the more optimistic view adopted by some
commentators, according to which digitalization has the potential to improve
working conditions and contribute to a more stable form of growth, digitalization
in the case of Japan has been part of a broader process of neoliberalization, and in
doing so has contributed to the further dismantling of the social compromise that
underpinned Japan’s earlier period of economic growth.
Regulation theory and the wage-labour nexus in Japan
Regulation Theory is a Marxist-rooted approach to heterodox political economy
which seeks to understand the transformation of different forms of capitalism, each
of which consists of a different combination of different types of socio-economic
institutions (Boyer, 2018). Some models of capitalism are more subject to change
than others, which during the period of neoliberalism has meant that institutions
in some countries have undergone more thorough processes of neoliberalization
than others (Amable, 2017, p. 1). This paper draws on Regulation Theory and its
emphasis on the role of institutional configurations, in order to explore the impact
of digitalization on workers in Japan. This section examines the way in which one
of Japan’s key institutional forms – the wage-labour nexus - has experienced this
process of digitalization. In doing so, the term ‘wage-labour nexus’ refers to a sys-
tem or mechanism which coordinates employment relations and manages/sup-
presses demands from unions and workers in exchange for a certain degree of
social (or socio-economic) compromise.
As Lechevalier et al. (2014) describes, Regulation Theorists view social com-
promise as a necessary goal within the wage-labour nexus, which can be achieved
through measures such as skill training, innovation, and employment security (pp.
86-87). Indeed, the classic form of Japanese capitalism, which is typically viewed as
having been in place from the 1950s to the 1980s, is commonly considered to have
been built upon such a form of social compromise (Lechevalier et al., 2014).
Importantly, however, this social compromise in Japan was dualistic. The employ-
ment security that existed within large firms sat alongside, and in part depended
upon, insecurity in small firms. Regular workers’ security was enabled by the inse-
curity of non-regular workers and workers in small firms. Male workers’ employ-
ment security was enhanced by the insecurity of female workers under the male
breadwinner model (2014, pp. 87–89). The social compromise associated with the
classic Japanese model was not therefore egalitarian, but it was nevertheless more
equal than other (neo)liberal models of capitalism. In particular, it provided forms
of non-market coordination which limited the growth of labour market inequality
in Japan (Lechevalier et al., 2014, p. 88). From the 1990s onwards, however, Japan
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has seen a weakening of equality, and a decline in social compromise and employ-
ment security, as a result of decay of previous coordination forms, the diffusion of
neoliberal norms and practices, and an increase in heterogeneity of Japanese firms
(Lechevalier et al., 2014, p. 92–100; Shibata, 2020). As a result of this transformation,
Japan has experienced an increase in long-term employment, and an ending of the
seniority wage system and enterprise unionism, resulting in Japan becoming one of
the least equal among the OECD countries (Lechevalier et al., 2014, pp. 103–104).
Digitalization has been viewed as crucial for the economic growth of many
advanced economies, especially in the case of Japan. As Regulation Theory reminds
us, however, the way that digitalization progresses is itself embedded in the socio-
economic institutions and contexts in each national economy. Yamamoto (2019)
highlights the importance of considering not only wages and unemployment
(which technologies have an impact upon), but also the working practices, work-
style and nationally-specific labour market systems that also form part of the wage-
labour nexus. In the same way that neoliberalism has been adopted and progressed
in various forms, digitalization has been introduced differently depending on the
institutional context and socio-political configuration in each national economic
model within which it has occurred. We need to examine, therefore, national-
specific models of capitalism in order to consider how digitalization adapts itself to
particular labour markets, and whether this has the potential to contribute to the
creation of a new social compromise.
Regulation theory starts with the assumption that each model of capitalism has
tendencies towards crises and is therefore inherently unstable. Nevertheless, certain
models of regulation – which we can conceptualize as specific configurations of
socio-economic institutions – have the potential to have temporarily stabilizing
effects which suppress class conflict and create the conditions for economic growth
(Aglietta, 1998; Boyer & Saillard, 2002; Boyer & Yamada, 2000; Amable, 2016). As
such, both the specific nature of institutions, and the relationship between different
institutions, has an impact upon the socio-economic outcomes that arise (Boyer,
2019). While capitalism has arguably been resilient over time (Boyer, 2018, p. 15),
a number of studies highlight how the temporarily stabilizing effects of different
modes of regulation over time become dysfunctional (Lechevalier, 2014b; Hirano &
Yamada, 2018; Shibata, 2020; Vidal, 2013). In terms of the process of digitalization,
we need to consider how this has been adopted in specific contexts in order to
identify its effects and consequences and whether digitalization can lead to a new
social compromise.
As noted, the wage-labour nexus that emerged during the post-war period in
Japan is commonly viewed as having been marked by socio-economic compromise,
consisting of managed competition between corporations, incremental wage
increases, and long-term employment security, each of which were secured through
the voluntary moderation of demands on the part of organized labour. From the
1990s onwards, a declining level of cross-shareholding, a rise in the number of for-
eign/external board members, and a (resultant) trend towards increased priority for
shareholder values, each prompted an increase in the number of flexible workers, a
declining importance for collective wage negotiations, and a resultant stagnation of
wages, representing a faltering of Japan’s established wage-labour nexus. This can
be considered a disintegration or destabilization of Japan’s mode of regulation since
the 1990s, as the (contested) process of neoliberal restructuring has seen each of its
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socio-economic institutions subjected to sustained pressures for change. This has
also witnessed efforts by the state and corporate elites to seek a different mode of
regulation in order to stabilize the country’s employment relations (wage-labour
nexus) and (re-)establish the conditions for capital accumulation (Shibata, 2020).
This article focuses on the introduction of digitalization in Japan, and especially
its impact upon the Japanese labour market, or ‘wage-labour nexus’. This is partly
the result of a consistent effort by the government of Japan to promote digitaliza-
tion, especially within the service sector. This reflects a number of key public policy
concerns. The Japanese Ministry of Labour, Health and Welfare (MHLW) reports
that in 2018 on average roughly 55% of the firms in the hospitality industry
(hotels, restaurants and cafes) faced a labour shortage, especially of part-time work-
ers (2018, p. 7). The government focus on the service sector also reflects its relative
importance to national growth. The GDP of the service sector recently surpassed
the GDP of the manufacturing industry (Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting,
2017a, p. 5). Labour productivity in the service sector in Japan is only 60% of that
in the US (Nihon Keizai Saisei Honbu, 2015, p. 58). Further, labour productivity in
the hospitality industry in Japan (which we shall focus in more detail on below) is
only 34% of labour productivity of the US counterparts (Kinki Kezai Sangyo
Kyoku, 2017, p. 6). This disparity is typically considered a result of divergent
expectations regarding the labour intensive nature of customer service in Japan.
Digitalization is therefore typically considered a potential solution for two key
problems facing Japan’s labour market: a labour shortage and low labour
productivity.
An overview of digitalization in Japan: extending and intensifying
flexibilisation
In contrast to the claims of techno-optimists, many observers have raised concerns
that digitalization of the workplace has contributed to a disempowering of workers,
especially by extending and intensifying Japan’s already flexibilized labour market.
In order to understand these processes, we need to consider the broader transform-
ation of Japan’s socio-economic institutions, and especially labour market, over
recent years, and especially under the Abe administration (2013–2020). Figure 1
shows the expanding proportion of non-regular workers in Japan, which include
part-time workers, contract workers, and dispatch workers (temp agency workers),
and who tend to have fixed-term employment contracts. This trend accelerated
under the Abe administration from 2013 onwards with non-regular workers mak-
ing up nearly 40 percent of Japan’s workforce, the highest rate amongst the
advanced industrial economies. Digitalization overlaps with this trend of rising
number of non-regular workers, as the process of digitalization creates an oppor-
tunity for work tasks to be broken down into smaller, fragmented, tasks, which are
then allocated to non-regular workers as ‘gig work’, through temporary agencies, or
through some other form of flexible employment.
The move towards an increased proportion of non-regular employment within
Japan’s labour market has also been accompanied by slow wage growth. Figure 2
shows Japan’s limited wage growth over the last three decades in comparison to
other major economies. As Lechevalier and Laugier (2019) rightly point out, the
adoption of new productive technologies in Japan has commonly been used as a
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way to simultaneously limit wage growth. This was in part associated with the
move to hire a greater number of non-regular workers (Yamamoto, 2019).
Stagnating wage growth is especially an issue in the service sector, with many
employees viewing this as directly resulting from digitalization. Over 27% of those
surveyed in the service industry expect a decrease in wages directly as a result of
the introduction of AI (Rengo, 2018, p. 9).
Japan has a high level of work intensity in comparison to other economies (see
Figure 3). This includes a relatively high level of ‘job strain’, which the OECD
defines as jobs where workers face more job demands than the number of resour-
ces they have at their disposal. This in part results from an ongoing process of
work intensification that has occurred in Japan over a number of years, and which
also overlaps with the process of digitalization. Government labour market policy
has focused predominantly on flexibilization in recent years, with a strong focus on
being able to transfer between workplaces in order to further increase labour prod-
uctivity (Cabinet Office, 2016).
This move to flexibilization has gone hand-in-hand with the process of digital-
ization. For instance, a recent survey highlighted how 53% plan to increase “job-
type employment” (jobu gata koyou), rather than hiring new graduate trainees, as
part of moves to introduce AI (Mitsubishi UFJ Research & Consulting, 2017b,
p. 58). These results indicate that companies are shifting to a more flexible employ-
ment mechanism in the era of digitalization.
Digitalization adds another layer to this ongoing and already-advanced flexibili-
zation of employment relations in Japan, in which workers take up fragmented
tasks and fill in the gap between humans and machines. It is in this sense that we
should understand digitalization as furthering ongoing processes of labour market
flexibilization, and in doing so contributing to the dismantling of the social com-









































































































































































Proportion of employees by type, 1984-2020
Regular employee (%) Non-regular employee (%)
Figure 1. Proportion of employees by type in Japan, 1984–2020.
Source: Statistics Bureau of Japan (2020). Labour Force Survey, historical data, figure 9 (1)
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Government policy (failure)
In order to understand the ongoing development of the wage-labour nexus within
Japan we need also to consider government policy. Regulation Theory directs us
towards a search for public policy measures that might contribute to the creation
of new forms of social compromise (Lechevalier et al., 2014). As such, we are inter-
ested in both the question of what policies the government has adopted as part of
the process of digitalization, and the degree to which these represent the construc-
tion of a new form of institutionalized social compromise.
Table 1 presents a summary of the key policies introduced by the Abe adminis-
tration in the areas of both labour market policy and digitalization. These have typ-
ically promised to improve the quality of life for workers whilst at the same time
focusing on the introduction of infrastructure, finance, ICT literacy and productiv-
ity in order to ensure that Japanese firms become more globally competitive, while
largely failing to address questions of social exclusion and the flexibilizing labour
market. In the era of digitalization, flexibilization has become a key characteristic
of Japan’s labour market, in which only cosmetic policies are put in place without
much attempt to achieve consensus or create a social compromise. For Japan’s rela-
tively small welfare state, which has historically relied upon firms creating employ-
ment security, moves to reduce employment protection have further exacerbated
the lack of social security and equality in Japan.
As Table 1 shows, the labour market policies and reforms advocated by the Abe
administration (2013–2020) acted to further labour market flexibilization through-
out the period (and as such represent a further dismantling of the institutions of
social compromise that underpinned Japan’s earlier period of economic growth).
At the same time, the Japanese government, seeking to appease dissenting workers,
introduced a number of (superficial) concessions in drafting labour market policy
(see Table 1). This includes, the Workstyle Reform: The Japan’s Plan for Dynamic
Engagement of All Citizens, which consists of a mix of deregulation and re-regula-
tion labour market policies. These policies included a call for companies to increase







































































































































Average annual wages, US dollar
Germany Japan United Kingdom United States
Figure 2. Average annual wages, US dollars.
Source: OECD (2020a) Employment and Labour Market Statistics, Average annual wages.
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they also include a deregulatory policy which allows for the exemption of compul-
sory overtime pay (see Table 1, “High-Level professional system”). It also includes
the Revision of the Part-time Employment Act, Labour Contract Act and the Worker
Dispatching Act which aim for equal pay for equal work. In revising these acts, the
government encouraged firms to shift hiring practices, from non-regular to regular
workers, and to focus on equal treatment of non-regular workers in an attempt to
improve non-regular workers’ status. The government also declared the need to
create a better work-life balance by implementing the Amendment to Labour
Standard Act (see Table 1). This includes a new regulation to limit overtime work
(albeit with insufficient level of protection) in order to reduce working hours. As
already witnessed in Figure 2, however, wage growth has been limited throughout
this period and despite these measures being introduced, suggesting that they have
had little impact upon the concrete practices of firms.
The policies on digitalization introduced by the Abe government mainly seek to
create a business-friendly and robot-friendly environment (see Table 1). Some poli-
cies, including Society 5.0 and AI Strategy 2019, indicate the government’s inten-
sion to achieve work-life balance and human-centered AI society. Yet, these
policies tend to focus on the improvement of productivity, since low productivity
(in comparison to other advanced economies) has been a more long-standing con-
cerns for Japanese businesses. The 2019 New IT policy outline similarly focuses on
the improvement of business competitiveness. These policies in the area of digital-
ization appear to focus on the improvement of the business environment and to
accommodate digitalization, but pay less attention to the labour market challenges
and working condition.
A close examination of many of these policies reveals that they further the flexi-
bilization of the labour market, by presenting cosmetic improvements and the









Germany Japan United Kingdom United States
Job quality, 2015
Earnings quality (in constant prices, at constant PPPs) US Dollar
Labour market insecurity (%)
Job Strain (%)
Figure 3. Comparison of job quality.
Source: OECD (2015) Job quality
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despite at the same time arguably worsening the labour market protection available
to employees. This is reflected in the way in which the measures have been
received by representatives of organized labour. For instance, as trade union activist
Mikamoto (NPO POSSE) argued, Abe government’s labour market reforms fails to
incorporate the views of workers’ or unions’ voices, and reforms remain superficial
and largely perpetuate precarious hiring practices (interview, January 23, 2019).
This reflects the reduced strength of organized labour more generally within
Japan’s current model of capitalism (Imai, 2021, Watanabe, 2018). According to
one Rengo survey, the majority of non-regular workers still face low wages,
unequal treatment and no improvement in their employment status (2018, p. 7, 10,
14–15). These problems are compounded by the lack of opportunity for organized
labour to contribute to government decision-making. One of the study groups
attached to the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) on Workstyle
failed to include a single representative of trade unions in its membership (2017).
Moreover, discretionary working hours, one of the workstyle reforms advocated by
the government, are supposed to increase workers’ discretion, but in reality this
serves to enable firms to avoid making overtime payments (S. Mikamoto, interview,
January 23, 2019).
Digitalization as profit-oriented restructuring
According to Lechevalier and Laugier (2019), Japan’s success in production in the
1970s and 1980s was underpinned by its approach to human resource manage-
ment, which entailed corporate investment in training workers and Toyotism (effi-
cient production mechanism including just-in-time production and teamwork), and
the organization of production, rather than technology itself. Workers were typic-
ally well-trained and were cognizant of the wider process of production. Workers’
well-being and the stable increase of wages also considered to contribute to the cre-
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market and firms in Japan underwent a process of neoliberalization (Lechevalier &
Laugier, 2019).
This process of neoliberalization has also witnessed a concerted effort by firms
to hold down wages in an attempt to increase the profit share, including through
the restructuring of firms. It is here, moreover, that we see a further overlap
between the wider processes of neoliberalization and that of digitalization. Business
managers have consistently adopted digitalization in an attempt to improve labour
productivity and increase profit, resulting in the intensification of work and under-
mining workers’ status. For instance, Keidanren, the Japanese business association,
proposed a set of reforms in its document, ‘workstyle in the era of Society 5.00,
that encouraged more flexible work, including tele-working, satellite office, flexible
working hours, side businesses, the integration of robots and the creation of higher
value-added work (2020).
Digitalization has been viewed by firms as a means by which to shorten nominal
working hours. Average annual hours worked in Japan’s labour market have
declined steadily since the early 1990s (Figure 4). This decline in working hours
largely reflects the increase in the number of non-regular workers who are made to
work flexibly and for shorter hours as well as due to the fragmentation of work.
Digitalization has increased labour productivity, but it has not so far created secure
and stable employment. In the era of the coronavirus crisis, business owners have
moved increasingly to fire workers, and especially non-regular workers (Toyo
Keizai Online, 2020).
As noted, these trends form part of a wider process whereby Japan’s model of
capitalism has witnessed moves towards a heightened focus on profit and finance,
which in turn has had unfavorable consequences for workers (Hirano & Yamada,
2018). Corporations have increased their profits while (as we saw in Figure 2)
wages have stagnated. This move towards a more profit-oriented model is unlikely
to be reversed as a result of digitalization.
The move towards a more profit-focused model of capitalism has been viewed
by many as a sign of success, despite the low levels of growth in Japan over the
past three decades. These profits have been largely achieved through the flexibiliza-
tion of employment, rather than Japan’s monetary and fiscal policies. Real wages
have moved lower than those in other advanced economies. As such, the mainten-
ance of profits on the side of companies stems from efforts to keep the wage share
low. Regardless of the efficiency and higher productivity generated by digitalization,
profits and benefits have not been shared with workers. This has been exacerbated
by digitalization, which has increased the reliance upon low-skilled work. This low-
waged and low-skilled work has largely been taken up by non-regular workers,
women, foreign, and part-time student workers. These workers are increasingly
replaceable as employers tend to hire them flexibly rather than invest in them for
their skill improvement. When profits are under pressure, employers tend to
lengthen working time and reduce prices, and the cost of these measures fall largely
on the shoulders of employees (Arata, 2014). In some cases, as introduced above,
digitalization has intensified work by reducing the number of staff in order to
reduce labour costs.
In sum, and as we have seen, the introduction of digitalization into the current
Japanese model of capitalism has seen advantages disproportionately benefit firms
rather than result in an improvement of employment or working conditions in the
12 S. SHIBATA
way that techno-optimists have hoped. As such, digitalization presents a new
avenue for the government and business to seek a more flexible employment sys-
tem, furthering the neoliberalization of Japan’s political economy and contributing
to the ongoing dismantling of the social compromise that underpinned Japan’s ear-
lier period of economic growth. This has exacerbated the digital divide between
skilled and low skilled workers, between workers and managers, and between
employees and owners of technologies. Digitalization has thus far failed to improve
wages, employment status or working conditions and continues to undermine
workers’ status while business elites continue to adopt digitalization as a means to
achieve profit-oriented restructuring. We turn now to consider in more detail some
of these key trends in the case of Japan’s hospitality sector, drawing on qualitative
interviews in order to highlight the impact of digitalization upon working and
employment practices within a sector that has witnessed considerable efforts to
restructure through the introduction of a range of new digital technologies.
Digitalization in japan’s hospitality sector
This section explores the introduction of digitalization in the hospitality industry
(restaurants, cafes, hotels) in Japan. It draws on semi-structured interviews con-
ducted with 20 managers in the hospitality industry (restaurants, cafes, hotels) and
15 union officials between 2018 and 2019, as well as journalistic reports and official
documents. It traces the process through which digitalization has occurred, how
and why it has been adopted, what outcomes it has generated, and how it has
changed employment relations. The findings provide an in-depth analysis of change
in the workplace in the hospitality industry which has resulted from digitalization,
highlighting the way in which these moves have generated deskilling, the fragmen-
tation of work tasks, an exacerbation of a digital divide, the intensification of work,
and higher levels of surveillance; all of which represents a further dismantling of
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Figure 4. Average annual hours worked per worker, 1991-2019.
Source: OECD (2020b) Employment and Labour Market Statistics, hours worked
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Table 2 presents a list of tasks which were introduced as part of the process of
digitalization in the hospitality sector and the specific effects associated with digit-
alization. As the table shows, digitalization has led to an increase in labour prod-
uctivity and increased subordination of employees’ tasks to customers’ demands as
data is used to increase surveillance and disciplining of workers in the workplace
(Zuboff, 2019). These are developments, moreover, that have been actively pro-
moted by government policy, with the Cabinet Office explicitly advocating the
move to digitalization as part of move towards a more flexible working environ-
ment and flexible workforce in the foodservice industry (Cabinet Office, 2016).
Key consequences of digitalization in the hospitality sector
As was highlighted in a number of the interviews conducted as part of the present
research, as well as in the publications of unions, business associations and official
documents, digitalization has not consistently reduced workload nor improved
working conditions or employment practices. Instead, digitalization has led to
problems of deskilling, a digital divide, and excessive pressure on staff who are
increasingly required to be ‘agile’ and adjust to new technology. In addition, digit-
alization has often made workers more dependent on technologies and as a result
reduced the level of workers’ autonomy.
Deskilling, digital divide and reducing the autonomy of workers
Technological development often produces a polarization of high and low-skilled
workers, as medium-skilled workers are squeezed out of the labour market. As one
sushi chef put it, in raising his concerns over how the ‘chef used to be able to
check the dining room and the number of customers and how long they are sitting,
and decide the number of pieces of sushi to prepare’ (A. Tsuji, interview June 8,
2018). Instead, now automated restaurants of the Kura corporation digitalize cus-
tomer data at their entrance, allowing chefs to rely on data provided on a digital
screen. Whilst managers view this digitalization as a means by which to make it
easier to train sushi chefs, at the same time it also represents a process of deskill-
ing, which in turn creates the polarization and digital divide between skilled and
unskilled employees.
The widening gap between skilled and unskilled workers in Japan’s digitizing
service sector labour market is becoming increasingly problematic. A number of
reports highlight how nearly half of Japan’s workforce is at risk of being replaced
by automation (Nomura Research Institute, 2016; Mitsuhashi, 2016, p. 16). During
interviews, this was raised by a number of managers who highlight how the digital
divide is becoming more of a problem in Japan than the risk of unemployment.
While knowledge-based skilled workers (such as computer engineers and pro-
grammers) have typically benefited from the process of digitalization, workers in
the foodservice industry have suffered from the same process. Due to inadequate
skill sets in the digitized workplace, some staff have been unable to catch up with
the pace of new technologies. A number of managers also mentioned that employ-
ees find it hard to adjust to new technologies due to the considerable adjustment
to the flow of work associated with the introduction of new technology, including
increased technological knowhow (M. Hayasaka, interview, January 21, 2019).
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Table 2. The digitalization in the hospitality industry in Japan.
Areas of digitalization Types of digitalization Achieved effects
Advertising/promotion IoT, AI, automated notification
system, digital signs to notify
the vacancy
Speedy information, accurate
information on waiting time
and vacancies, higher
satisfaction level of customers
from clear signs of vacancy
Booking Digitized customer files on the
online platform
24/7 digitized booking system,
smartphone booking





booking mistakes and time
spent on managing bookings,
frequent updates (improved
visibility), connect customer
information with the point of
sale (resultant behavioral
surplus), more variety of
hotel plans
Customers to the tables/
automated check-in
Emotional robots, digital
identification of empty seats,
data on customer at the
entrance, face recognition,
self-service to the table,
automated check-in
Efficiency, reduction of workers,
agile service, improved labour
productivity, translation service
for overseas customers, more
accurate data input on the
number of customers and
time management, visual
entertainment, translation
service for foreign customers,
more face-to-face service
where necessary, a solution for
a labour shortage
Ordering Tablets, smartphone order,
computerized and self-service,
registered customers,
instruction on how to eat
specific food
Efficiency, simplification, speed,
visual image of each menu,
increase labour productivity, a
solution for a labour shortage,
reduce food wastes,
translation service for foreign
customers, simplify tasks for
particularly the elderly staffs





Cooking Robots chef, robot bartender,
cafe robot, machine
learning (menu)
Reduced burden on human
labour, efficiency,
simplification of cooking for
new, foreign and elderly staffs,
visual entertainment, more
personalized menu,
Food serving Robots (food and dish carrying
robot), automation (conveyor
belt) and wearable device
Reduced burden on human
labour, simplification of work
and easier training of staffs,
efficiency, a solution for a
labour shortage, agile food
delivery, visual entertainment,
the maintenance of low priced
food, more accurate analysis
of customer preferences from
conveyor belts, reduction of
(continued)
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Table 2. Continued.
Areas of digitalization Types of digitalization Achieved effects
food wastes, improved
customer service
Kitchen and storage room (arm) robots, washing machine/
robots, plate slots machine
learning, automated
temperature control, the plate
collection device
improved working conditions for
staff, reduced burden, increase
in labour productivity,
simplification, increased food
hygiene and more accurate
control of temperatures and
reliable records
Payment Digitized bill with ordering, self-
service payment, face
recognition, digital food tray,
cashless system
Increased efficiency and speed,
reduce mistakes of calculation,
improved labour productivity,
simplification at point of sale,
translation service for
foreign customers
Training Digitized manual Efficiency, labour productivity,
easier management of the
new hires, reduction in time in
training, reduce paper waste
(booklet), more time available
for human service
Inventory management IoT, digitized inventory (Smart




reduced burden on human
labour, automatic
measurement of an individual
stock, alert of replenishment,
automatically order products
in shortage, efficient
management of stock and
inventory, improved labour
productivity, a solution for
labour shortage, automatic
measurement of food in each
container in buffet restaurants,
reduce food waste, enable
staff to focus on human
service, monthly and yearly





(registered customer) and data
Simplification of accounting,




for foreign customers, a
solution for a labour shortage,
easier management of data
on sales
Monitoring Wearable devices, vein
authentication, camera check
of all chain restaurants
Cost cut, reduce cheating/
slacking by staff, improve staff
efficiency, agile service to
customers’ requests/demands,
minimize time in going to
each table, quieter dining
environment, more accuracy
on the number of customers






Digitalization also has the potential to reduce the autonomy of workers by mon-
itoring and controlling the workplace environment. One of the reasons for employ-
ers to adopt new technologies, such as in the move to the so-called ‘Internet of
Things (IoT)’ is to monitor employees’ work and to ensure continual working
(Kinki Keizai Sangyo Kyoku, 2017, p. 19). As one interviewee put it, ‘The monitor-
ing device (camera) in each restaurant enables all managers to provide a consistent
service even though their wages decline (due to the simplification of management
work)’ (A. Tsuji, interview, June 8, 2018). Tsuji further commented that this moni-
toring mechanism has become particularly beneficial as managers become older,
enabling consistent customer service in all restaurants. The digital technology
adopted in Japan’s hospitality industry has acted to simplify the tasks and help the
ageing workforce. However, it has also started stripping away workers’ skills,
human decisions and autonomy, and ensuring the maintenance of low wages, while
increasing the level of workplace surveillance.
This situation resonates with a broader tendency to move towards surveillance
capitalism (Zuboff, 2019). The surveillance system has been witnessed in Japan’s
foodservice sector, where staff have increasingly become dependent on technologies
to calculate and estimate customers’ behaviors (A. Tsuji, interview, June 8, 2018).
This has led to a loss of self-control for chefs and serving staff. The increased
dependency on technology implies a reduction in workers’ autonomy, which also
challenges the capacities of workers to improve their skills.
There is, however, a lack of skilled workers who can manoeuver this system. As
one of the interviewees put it, ‘the foodservice industry tends to attract low skilled
Table 2. Continued.
Areas of digitalization Types of digitalization Achieved effects
individual wages, linking to





Staff management Vein authentication system, AI,
video monitoring
AI simplified the estimation of
the approximate number of
potential customers and the
formulation of staff shifts.
Manage staff working hours
accurately without false
information. Monitor workers
and provide the same quality
service in all chains.
Job interview AI (through a smartphone) 24/7 availability of interview,
increase opportunities to
secure potentially suitable
candidates, reduce the time
between the submission of
applications and the first day
of work, speeding up the
entire hiring process, a
solution for labour shortage,
reduce the potentially wasted
time and risk in case of
no show
(Source: Author’s own compilation).
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workers’ (Hibiki, interview, August 18, 2018). Data processing and communication
engineers and system engineers have recently become in high demand and their
wages in Japan are twice as high as other jobs (Nihon Keizai Shinbun, 2019).
Under the digitizing workplace, these low skilled workers in the foodservice sector
became dependent on technology while tech-skilled engineers and cognitive work-
ers become more valuable, increasing the digital divide.
In this sense, we might argue that digitalization tends to optimize work, but
deprive workers of their opportunity to improve their skills and knowledge.
Managers who can integrate digitalization in the workplace, and corporations
which sell new technologies, are each more likely to gain from their knowledge
production. As one union official interviewed stated, there is a divide between
workers who can only perform simple tasks and those who can work creatively
with cognitive knowledge (T. Chiba, interview, March 28, 2019).
The process of deskilling of some workers has a subsequent effect upon the
wages paid to those deskilled workers. This is a fear widely felt across the sector.
For instance, according to Rengo’s ‘Survey on AI’, roughly 30 percent of workers
in the foodservice sector predict their wages will decline and over 58 percent of
them predict their wages will not increase in the near future as a result of the inte-
gration of AI (Rengo, 2018, p. 9).
This is part of a wider process whereby digitalization has been part of, and acted
to further, the profit-oriented restructuring reforms introduced across the Japanese
economy. Again, this trend was especially notable in the hospitality sector, which
saw an increase in the level of profits from 2005 to 2018 (Figure 5). At the same
time, the sector has seen lower wages than other industries and the wage growth
over time has been weak (Figure 6). While it is not possible to explain this entirely
in terms of the move to digitalization, nevertheless the moves to introduce digital-
ization have clearly enabled some of the outcomes that we have observed, in terms
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Figure 5. The current profits in the hospitality industry.
Source: Policy Research Institute (2020), Houjinkigyo toukei nennpou tokusyu.
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Agility and intensification of work
Digitalization requires workers to adapt themselves to a new speed, new efficiency
and new ways of doing things in the workplace. Employers need elderly workers to
be efficient, in particular, in the hospitality sector. Some employers adopted new
technologies to simplify tasks for elderly workers. In the words of one interviewee,
‘elderly workers tend to be slow in taking orders and sometimes have difficulties
hearing customers’ requests and orders. This is why technologies have become use-
ful for elderly workers’ (M. Kourai, interview, December 28, 2019). In this sense,
digitalization is sometimes presented as a panacea, on the grounds that it is able to
make elderly workers efficient as well as support low-skilled and deskilled workers
by simplifying tasks. This potential, however, also risks locking those workers into
being deskilled and low-waged whilst demanding them to be agile. Agile workers
may increase labour productivity, but they do not necessarily benefit from it.
Digital devices demand agility from workers. For instance, wearable devices
have become a way of speeding up the customer service. Digitalization therefore
has the potential to impose efficiency and agility upon workers. The wearable devi-
ces used in Japan as part of digitalization act to intensify working conditions by
requiring workers to be quick to respond to customers’ demands. One example is
the Noodoe, the wearable digital bell, which has begun to be adopted in a large
number of restaurants and cafes in Japan. It acts by digitally notifying waiters and
waitresses and chefs of the different types of demands from customers. This func-
tion can undoubtedly reduce the frequency with which waiters and waitresses need
to go back and forwards to tables. In contrast, it has also increased pressure on
staff by urging them to respond to customers’ demands promptly. The device
enabled the chef to respond directly to customers’ needs. With this device, expecta-
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Figure 6. Monthly salaries by industry.
Source: e-Stat (2019) Chingin kouzou kihon toukei chyosa, Sangyo daibunrui
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efficiently, whereas employees gradually lose their decision-making and autonomy.
High speed and efficiency are normalized and standardized in the digital era, in
which unskilled workers are increasingly controlled by the devices.
The capacity for digitalization to replace human work represents an ‘automation
paradox’ (Decker et al., 2017). For Decker et al. (2017), it is important that tasks
be performed by humans rather than by automation. Otherwise, the ’automation
paradox occurs, which means that, during normal operations, human workers have
to carry out cognitively draining activities, and in case of malfunctions or unex-
pected situations they suddenly have to make highly sophisticated decisions which
they do not master anymore’ (352). This paradox is already happening in the
Japanese service sector. Some chain sushi restaurants adopt digital machines which
show digital images of each piece of sushi, workers without high skills can make
sushi (Tajiri, interview, December 19, 2018, A. Maruyama, interview, January 15,
2019). Low-skilled workers have become dependent on digital devices. When
machines break, low-skilled chefs are required to adapt themselves to cook without
any digital data or appliances and are expected to perform experienced chefs’ skills,
requiring prompt decision-making, adaptability and agility.
The automation paradox also results in the intensification of work. This paradox
applies to the case of wearable devices such as Noodoe discussed above. Without
this device, the waiters/waitresses do not have the skills to serve customers
promptly. Replacing human tasks with digitalization creates an automation para-
dox, in which work is intensified as workers become dependent on machines and
devices, creating serious challenges once those machines break. Workers who are
deemed to be low-skilled are expected to perform efficiently when machines
malfunction.
Intensification of work in the digital era is associated with ‘Digital Taylorism’, in
which digital technologies and automation simplify and optimize the principles of
work and work control for complicated tasks (Hirsch-Kreinsen, 2016, p. 7). This
optimization of work often leads to the intensification of work for employees. For
instance, Harada of Shutoken Seinen Union (Youth Union in Capital Area) warns
that ‘digitalization increased efficiency and improved labour productivity, but also
forces workers to do everything by him/herself (N. Harada, interview, July 11,
2018). In one of the chain cafes in Japan, digitalization acted to simplify tasks,
leading part-time workers to take responsibility for managing the whole cafe.
Simplification and improved efficiency of work importantly means the intensifica-
tion of work for some workers and forces low-skilled workers to conduct more
tasks beyond their job description without adequate payment for workers. This
type of one-person operation is a common outcome of Digital Taylorism. Harada
further comments that, even if digitalization enables shorter working hours, it may
not improve working condition and fails to secure the necessary wages needed to
sustain living standards if employers do not make efforts to improve working con-
dition. Thus, digitalization enables employers to hire workers for shorter periods of
time, with several managers who were interviewed stating that digitalization had
led to a shortening of nominal working hours; a trend which has been particularly
notable in the hospitality industry (Figure 7).
Digital Taylorism, once it has fragmented the tasks of workers, amounts to the
further alienation of workers, who find themselves with far less control over the
labour process and subject to greater control by machines and devices. The floor
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staff in restaurants and cafes, for instance, are increasingly expected to have res-
taurant management skills, as these tasks become simplified and controlled by devi-
ces (A. Tsuji, interview, June 8, 2018). These new devices, including tablets and
smartphones, see staff and chefs in the kitchen also increasingly required to follow
digital orders made through machines. Workers in the foodservice industry have
thus increasingly become dependent on inventory devices and temperature con-
trol machines.
Limitation to automation
Digitalization also comes with the risk of technical failure, which can cause signifi-
cant inconvenience and inefficiency. Hibiki, the CEO of the restaurant Hibiki, pre-
dicts that many tasks in the restaurant industry will be replaced or supported by
automation and digitisation. Nevertheless, he is also aware of the challenges that
digitalization creates. In his words:
digitalization faces its limits when there is no Wi-Fi. The disruption of Wi-Fi is not
unusual in the workplace and happens often. The software company from which we
installed the digital devices did not respond to the problem since they said the problem is
the Wi-Fi system. On the other hand, the internet provider said that there was no problem
with the Wi-Fi. This became a frustrating situation where nobody was willing to help us
(Hibiki, interview, August 18, 2018).
The maintenance of sometimes-not-so-intelligent devices can increase the level
of stress experienced by workers. Ooura, at the Ganko Food Service Co. similarly
warns of the importance of contracting an urgent support mechanism for some
lines of work which cannot be replaced by a human, as otherwise everything may
stop (interview, June 8, 2018). Another interesting example is the case of the emo-
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Figure 7. Hours worked indices by industry (total hours worked).
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that only 15% of Hamazushi chain stores which signed up to have Peppers in their
store would opt to keep Pepper after their three-year-contract expired. Roughly 80
percent of stores answered to say that they do not need the robot (Fukui, 2018).
This implies that some technologies are not entirely popular for employees but
they can be a nuisance to maneuverer. Installing digitalization can end up being
more expensive than expected. The extra costs can trigger the reduction of
labour costs.
This is the case not only with the instalment and the maintenance of new digital
devices but also with regard to upgrading. Hayasaka at Huis Ten Bosh commented
on the necessity of updating technologies. As he put it, ‘Henna Hotel introduced
robots at the hotel reception five years ago, but they have now started looking out
of date. We are thinking of changing to something new’ (M. Hayasaka, interview,
January 21, 2019). As this example illustrates, digitalization requires continuous
maintenance and costly upgrading.
Further, digitalization is not universally beneficial nor intelligent. Small cafes
and restaurants especially do not benefit from certain types of automation. The
foodservice industry in Japan is predominantly made up of small-scale businesses,
which in turn is associated with a low rate of digitalization. According to a survey
conducted by the trade union confederation, Rengo, workers in the hospitality
industry have lower expectation in AI with only 40% having a high expectation.
This compares with 70% in the finance sector (2018, p. 4). This survey also demon-
strates that 62% of surveyed workers in the hospitality industry think AI would not
change their workload (2018, p. 8). As this example illustrates, the adoption of
technology is not a straightforward solution for labour shortages and does not
invariably reduce workload.
As should be clear from the above, we need to avoid any overly rosy evaluation
regarding the introduction of technology that ignores the potential harm that can
be done to the capacity for human labour. One interesting example is that of the
large restaurant chain, Yoshinoya, which introduced Al-based interviews using
smartphones for the first round of job interviews in an attempt to save time. This
raises the question of whether such a process can be free from prejudice and dis-
crimination in terms of gender, race and skill levels. In the hospitality industry,
where the turnover of workers is high, AI-based interviews are often used to filter
candidates. This may reduce opportunities for people who do not own smart-
phones and lack skills and experiences before they have a chance to get to inter-
views. When AI decides who can proceed to the next round of interviews, this has
the potential to introduce significant bias and to work against female workers, eld-
erly workers, disabled workers, and foreign workers who tend to have fewer oppor-
tunities in the job market.
Conclusion
Digitalization in Japan has been advanced by both by firms and the state, as part
of a wider process of neoliberalization, witnessing efforts to accelerate the flexibili-
zation of the labour market and ensure profit-oriented restructuring. This contrasts
markedly with the views of the so-called ‘techno-optimists’ who view digitalization
as having the potential to improve working conditions and employment practices,
as well as the broader living conditions of workers and citizens. Instead,
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digitalization has contributed to deskilling, the fragmentation of work tasks, an
exacerbation of the digital divide, the intensification of work, and higher levels of
workplace surveillance. This represents a further dismantling, ongoing since the
1990s, of the social compromise that underpinned Japan’s earlier period of eco-
nomic growth (Lechevalier et al., 2014; Shibata, 2020).
Digitalization has furthered the fragmentation of work, deskilling and social
disconnectedness experienced by workers, and compounded low wages and
precarious working conditions, as part of a wider process of profit-oriented
restructuring. This has seen workers increasingly required to be ‘agile’, and
increasingly monitored with the new surveillance technology. In the case of the
hospitality industry studied in this paper, the benefits achieved through digital-
ization have largely been felt by employers and firms, and far less so
by workers.
Whilst the move to digitalization is a global trend, the present paper has
explored its implementation across the socio-economy of Japan, as well as through
a more detailed exploration of developments in the Japanese hospitality sector. As
we have seen, changes to the labour market and employment practices of firms are
embedded within a broader institutional configuration, meaning that the introduc-
tion of technology as witnessed through the digitalization of the Japanese economy
is done in such a way that reflects broader socio-economic and institutional proc-
esses. The broader process of neoliberalization of Japan has shaped and influenced
the way in which digitalization has been introduced, and likewise witnessed digital-
ization contribute to the form that neoliberalization is taking in the case of Japan.
This therefore represents an important lesson for those interested in the develop-
ment of Japan’s model of capitalism, but also contributes to our knowledge of the
development of comparative capitalisms, as neoliberalism is increasingly challenged,
and continues to morph globally (with national specificities) in the wake of the
Covid-19 crisis. Efforts to put digitalization to good use require a consideration
(and critical evaluation) of the wider configuration of socio-economic institutions
that constitute any particular national model of capitalism, which itself must be
understood in terms of its place within the wider global political economy. It is to
this end that the present paper contributes, in exploring the digitalization of
Japan’s neoliberalizing model of capitalism.
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